Terrorism has quickly emerged as a primary problem for law enforcement administrators and personnel working at both the federal and local levels. The frightening reality of homegrown terror became clear after the 1995 bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. The subsequent and stunningly successful attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, demonstrated that America had become a primary target of international terrorists as well. The law enforcement industry has attempted to quickly respond to these emerging threats by expanding the traditional roles of investigators and officers on the street and by using a broad range of strategies designed to mitigate both domestic and international terror threats. These antiterrorism strategies include (1) the expansion of federal law enforcement counterintelligence structures, (2) the targeting of terrorist funding sources, and (3) the development of antiterror and collaborative strategies at the state and local law enforcement levels (Swanson et al. 2005).
The existence of large-scale threats from terrorist groups has highlighted the importance of federal law enforcement counter-intelligence structures, primarily involved in terrorism prevention and investigation, intelligence gathering, and foreign counterintelligence. Important federal law enforcement counterintelligence structures include the Department of Homeland Security, the National Infrastructure Protection Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Counterterrorism Center, and the National Domestic Preparedness Office.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was established by President George W. Bush as an immediate response to the 9/11 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. DHS has a significant role in intelligence gathering and analysis and has administered the development of Homeland Security Operations Centers across the United States. These centers are charged with gathering information and intelligence analysis, primarily as it relates to protecting the nation’s critical infrastructure. Operating under the DHS banner, the U.S. Secret Service also continues to play a prominent role through its Threat Analysis Center. Beyond these strategies, the creation of DHS from numerous previously established federal law enforcement agencies is an attempt to implement a more comprehensive national strategy to prevent, respond to, and recover from terrorist acts occurring within the United States (Swanson et al. 2005).
The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) was founded in 1998, and the organization operates within the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). NIPC was created on the recommendation of the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection (1998), which highlighted the role of federal agencies in protecting critical computer systems against terrorist activities. The federal government owns and operates many critical infrastructure systems, including transportation, energy, and government operations. Thus, federal agencies would be the primary responders in the event of a national crisis. NIPC’s InfraGard, a pilot project designed to facilitate the exchange of information among academic institutions, the government, and the business community, serves as a prime example of the push toward interagency and business collaboration in the fight against terrorism (Taylor et al. 2005).
The FBI’s Counterterrorism Center has also expanded since its inception in 1996 in order to respond to international terror operations emanating from both within the United States and abroad, as well as those threats that are purely domestic in character. The center uses personnel employed by eighteen federal agencies, including the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State, and the Secret Service. The Departments of Justice, Defense, Energy, and Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency formed the National Domestic Preparedness Office (NDPO) in 1998 (Swanson et al. 2005). NDPO is responsible for assisting state and local authorities with the planning, training, and equipment necessary for responding to any terrorist attacks that may involve weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
In addition to these initiatives aimed at revamping or improving traditional reactive strategies, the federal law enforcement community has increasingly recognized the need to become more proactive in the war against terror—to disrupt the support networks that enable terrorist organizations so that future terrorist acts can be prevented before they occur. One of these more proactive approaches involves the disruption of financial networks that support terrorist operations.
Terrorist organizations use a wide variety of funding sources to accomplish their objectives. The number of funding sources a given terrorist organization utilizes is necessarily dependent on the scope of the criminal organization. For example, smaller organizations such as some small-scale, domestic paramilitary right-wing groups may not have exorbitant financial needs; however, it is estimated that large-scale international terrorist activities such as the 9/11 attacks may cost upward of $500,000 to plan, coordinate, and carry out (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, n.d.). The law enforcement industry has implemented a range of strategies designed to cut off many of the most common revenue streams used by terrorist groups, including (1) fraudulent use of the international banking system, (2) drug smuggling, and (3) arms smuggling.
The international community has recently taken steps to halt the fraudulent use of banking systems. Terrorist groups use these systems primarily to ”launder” illegally obtained funds so that the monies cannot be seized and/or detected by the police. In 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act was passed. Provisions of the law specifically strengthen measures used to prevent, detect, and prosecute terrorist financing and money laundering activities (Swanson et al. 2005). In addition, the Treasury Department, the FBI, and the CIA have collaborated on the creation of the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center (FTAT). FTAT is designed to identify terrorist financial infrastructures and eliminate the ability of terror groups to use the international monetary system as a means to protect their assets (Swanson et al. 2005). Finally, the United Nations created a Counter-Terrorism Committee to monitor and implement U.N. Resolution 1373. The resolution imposes binding measures on all member states to prevent the financing of international terrorism (United States Mission to the United Nations 2002).
Drug smuggling has traditionally provided terror groups a stable funding source. The term ”narcoterrorism” has been used to describe the linkage between the illegal drug trade and terrorist organizations. It is estimated that profits derived from the sale of illegal narcotics fund terror organizations in as many as thirty nations. The al Qaeda group responsible for the 9/11 attacks, for example, obtained much of its initial financing through the opium trade in Afghanistan (Swanson et al. 2005). The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration identifies three critical elements to attacking narcoterrorism: law enforcement initiatives, intelligence operations, and global cooperation. These efforts have most recently focused on the activities of Middle Eastern terror groups. For instance, in 2002, Operation Mountain Express resulted in the arrest 136 people and the seizure of thirty-six tons of pseudophedrine, 179 pounds of methamphetamine, and $4.5 million (Swanson et al. 2005).
In addition to drug smuggling, terror groups commonly trade in weapons to generate funds. Often, weapons are traded for other commodities (such as drugs), which can then be converted into hard currency. Terrorist organizations have expanded their use of weapons smuggling since the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the resulting influx of dangerous arms into the global market (Bolz 2002). Law enforcement initiatives in this area demand a large degree of international cooperation, given the global scope of the arms trade. For example, the Peruvian government recently foiled an attempt by FARC (Columbia’s oldest and best equipped insurgency group) to purchase ten thousand Russian-made AK-47 rifles through international cooperative law enforcement efforts (International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism 2000). So, too, U.S. law enforcement officials recently uncovered and were able to thwart a plot instigated by groups in Pakistan to purchase a variety of high-tech weapons, including two hundred U.S.-made Stinger missiles (Frieden 2001).
The role of local and state officers in combating terrorism has also greatly expanded since the 9/11 attacks. Knowledge gained by investigating terrorist groups since 9/11 has revealed that these groups often exhibit a pattern of activity or actions that typically precede major terror attacks (Swanson et al. 2005). These ”pre-incident indicators” have quickly become the focus of local law enforcement antiterrorism training efforts. These indicators provide clues as to potential threats and future plans. This training often emphasizes the need for local officers to be aware of suspicious activities, use critical thinking skills, and update their knowledge base concerning potential terrorist threats in their local area (Swanson et al. 2005). The Bureau of Justice Assistance provides local and state agencies free intelligence-related training for street officers and detectives assigned to antiterrorism task forces through a program called SLATT (State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training).
Given that the planning, funding, and execution of terrorist activities invariably crosses multiple law enforcement jurisdictions, state and local agencies have greatly increased participation in Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs). JTTFs are responsible for gathering and acting on intelligence related to international and domestic terrorism and conducting investigations related to planned terrorist attacks. JTTFs are directly supervised by the FBI and consist of officers representing federal agencies and state and local organizations. Since the establishment of the first JTTF in New York City in 1980, twenty-seven JTTFs have been created nationwide (Federal Bureau of Investigation 1999).
See also: Terrorism: Definitional Problems; Terrorism: Domestic; Terrorism, International; Terrorism: Overview.
References:
- Bolz, F. 2002. The counterterrorism handbook.Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press.
- Federal Bureau of Investigation. 1999. Terrorism in the United States, 44. Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation.
- Frieden, T. 2001. Federal agents charge four with arms smuggling. http://www.cnn.com/2001/LAW/06/15/arms.smuggling/ (June 15, 2001).
- International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism. 2000. Peru breaks up FARC arms smuggling ring. Herzlia, Israel: Institute for Counterterrorism.
- National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. n.d. Combating terrorist financing in the United States: The role of financial institutions, 87-113. Staff Monograph.
- Swanson, C. R., N. C. Chamelin, L. Territo, and R. W. Taylor. 2005. Criminal investigation. 9th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Taylor, R. W., T. J. Caeti, D. K. Loper, E. J. Fritsch, and J. Liederbach. 2005. Digital crime and digital terrorism. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson/Prentice-Hall.
- United States Mission to the United Nations. 2002. Statement by James Shinn, Special Adviser to the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, on Agenda Item 160, Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism, in the Sixth Committee of the Fifty-Seventh Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Press release #142-2 (02), October 3.