Essentialism is a philosophical doctrine that each object has an essence that makes that object what it is. Essence can be seen as a set of properties of a thing, which that thing must possess to be that particular thing.
The word essence is the English translation of a Latin term essentia, by which Roman translators tried to render the obscure original Aristotelian phrase ti en einai, which literally means “the what it was to be” for a thing. For Aristotle, the essence of a thing is both the cause of existence of that thing and a set of properties that defines the identity of the thing. A thing cannot change its essential properties as long as it exists or as far as it belongs to a particular kind, in contrast to nonessential, accidental properties, the loss of which affects neither existence nor kind-membership of a thing.
For Aristotle, essence is as important for ontology as for epistemology, because true knowledge (episteme, science) of something means to know the essence of a thing by grasping it with words in a specific way called definition. A definition is an account (logos) that signifies an essence, but we have to keep in mind that for Aristotle, definition is not about the meaning of something, but about what it is to be a something. It is important to point out that according to Aristotle, science is about kinds and the essences that define them, not about individuals, for science cannot be about accidental, random properties. Essence is thought to be common to all members of a kind, and as immutable and everlasting as kinds themselves. That is why true knowledge is possible: There is no reason for later revisions once true essences are discovered. This doctrine of essences and kinds is often called “Aristotelian essentialism.”
In many aspects, Aristotelian essences are similar to Platonic forms, with the one important difference, that essences dwell inside the things of this material world, not in a separate immaterial world of forms. This fusion of Platonic forms with Aristotelian essences started with neo-Platonism and was much more elaborated through the Middle Ages period by scholastics in a way to fit within Christian theology. Essences are seen by scholastic philosophy as eternal forms dwelling in God’s mind as paradigms according to which things are created (essence precedes existence), and are, of course, immutable and everlasting.
Critics of essentialism have attacked the immutability of essences, refuting the reality of essences as such. Locke rejected Aristotelian essentialism, but at the same time, he suggested two new types of essences: real and nominal. Real essences of material things are, according to Locke, their deep atomic structures, hidden to the naked eye. They are different from Aristotelian essences, for they are not eternal and immutable; they can be changed, as, for example, an internal frame of watch. But there are also nominal essences. Nominal essences are general names that relate to complex ideas, which we develop from experience by sorting things based on various perceivable qualities. Locke holds that there is no single, true sorting of things; there is no single, natural classification that reflects the relationship between natural kinds. In fact, according to Locke, there are many possible ways to classify the world.
The antiessentialist mood of today’s social and human scientists is mostly based on empirical studies of race, ethnicity, nationalism, and gender, and it refutes essentialism in general. Support for this general antiessentialism can be found in the philosophy of the 20th century. For example, logical positivists believed that the very idea of essential property is incoherent and that essentialism itself is outmoded intellectual past. Recently, essentialism in philosophy received a new impetus, with interest in modal logic (S. Kripke), but this did not have any impact on antiessentialism of contemporary social and human sciences.
A completely different approach to essentialism came from empirical studies in cognitive and developmental psychology during the last quarter of the 20th century. It was discovered that, from early childhood, the human mind develops essentialist biases. Developmental psychologist Susan Gelman contends that the bias of essentialism influences the way humans categorize things. Based on empirical studies with children, she believes that this “essentializing bias” is not directly taught, but rather occurs early in children as a way of making sense of their natural surroundings. These predispositions are shaped by language and intuitive folk theories about the world. It seems that people unconsciously believe in hidden essences responsible for observable similarities in members within a kind. They also believe in the real existence of natural kinds and a direct correspondence between language and basic categories of natural and social kinds.
Experiments demonstrate that we apply cognitive bias mostly to animal and plant species; to natural substances such as water and gold; and to social kinds such as race and gender. But we do not apply it to artificial kinds, such as tables or socks. These findings are in contrast with the opinion that essentialism itself is culturally constructed by historical coincidence like Western philosophy.
References:
- Atran, S. (1998). Folk biology and the anthropology of science: Cognitive universals and cultural particulars. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 21, 547-609.
- Gelman, S. A. (2003). The essential child: Origin of essentialism in everyday thought. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gil-White, F. J. (2001). Are ethnic groups biological “species” to the human brain? Current Anthropology, 42, 515-554.
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