The term ”terrorism” emerged in the aftermath of the French Revolution and was used to describe aggressive methods (arrests and executions) employed by the Jacobins against opponents and ”enemies of state” in 1793-1794. Yet, the phenomena it is commonly meant to describe are centuries old. Politically motivated violence was not always regarded as negative or undesirable. Political offenders were initially considered as the ”aristocrats of delinquency” by dint of their noble motives, altruism, and self-sacrifice. Tyrannicide (the killing of a tyrant) was not simply excused; it was a duty for classical Athenian citizens in order to protect their democracy, whereas in modern times, the doctrine of political offenders has been the reason for refusing requests for the extradition of wanted persons.
In recent years, the previous regime of lenience toward politically motivated offenders gave way to a regime of severity. International agreements and conventions increasingly included clauses doing away with the exception of political offense in matters of mutual legal assistance.
The term ”terrorist” is neither scientific nor objective, but polemical. It is a contested label one seeks to attach to an adversary. Consequently, there is no universally accepted definition in law or academic circles. The winner in certain conflicts is a hero, while the loser is branded a terrorist. Definitions are ephemeral because the balance of power may shift. Algerian ”terrorists” fighting French colonialism became legitimate governors. African National Congress leader Nelson Mandela spent decades behind bars before he became a remarkable head of state and Nobel Prize winner, guiding his country from apartheid to a process of reconciliation. In the Middle East, definitional battles between Palestinians and Israelis are ongoing, as they are between the United States and Cuba. The same occurs in areas of conflict in Asia, Africa, and the Americas.
Most controversies revolve around the legitimacy and identity of perpetrators (state and nonstate actors), the means employed (violence, threats, psychological, economic, military, or other), the victims (civilians, military, state representatives), how direct or indirect the involvement is, the ultimate objective, and the wider context (war, civil war, foreign occupation, peacetime hostilities). It is often difficult to distinguish terrorism from related concepts, such as low-intensity warfare, genocide, banditry, subversion, insurgency, guerilla, paramilitarism, rebellion, aggression, war crimes, crimes against humanity, resistance, liberation war. Not coincidentally, adversaries occasionally use the metaphors of war and armies in support of claims to legitimacy: Irish Republican Army, Japanese Red Army, Red Army Faction, Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Places, Albanian National Army, Army of the Righteous and Pure (Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Pakistan), People’s Liberation Army (EPL, Peru), United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), Sudan People’s Liberation Army, and so forth. The following definitions illustrate the range of approaches at the U.S. and international legal levels as well as from scholarly perspectives. According to Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d), ”The term ”terrorism” means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. The term ‘international terrorism’ means terrorism involving the territory or the citizens of more than one country.” According to 18 USC 2331 (2000), the term ”international terrorism” means activities that:
- Involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any state, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any state.
- Appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping 3. Occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum
The United Nations 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism covers financial support for any ”act which constitutes an offence within the scope of and as defined in one of the treaties listed in the annex” (nine of the universal instruments against terrorism—see below) and any act ”intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act” (Article 2).
The RAND and MIPT terrorism knowledge chronology define terrorism by
… the nature of the act, not by the identity of the perpetrators or the nature of the cause. Terrorism is violence, or the threat of violence, calculated to create an atmosphere of fear and alarm. These acts are designed to coerce others into actions they would not otherwise undertake, or refrain from actions they desired to take. All terrorist acts are crimes. Many would also be violation of the rules of war if a state of war existed. This violence or threat of violence is generally directed against civilian targets. The motives of all terrorists are political, and terrorist actions are generally carried out in a way that will achieve maximum publicity…. Finally, terrorist acts are intended to produce effects beyond the immediate physical damage of the cause, having long-term psychological repercussions on a particular target audience. The fear created by terrorists may be intended to cause people to exaggerate the strengths of the terrorist and the importance of the cause, to provoke governmental overreaction, to discourage dissent, or simply to intimidate and thereby enforce compliance with their demands.
Whereas ”domestic terrorism” is defined as ”incidents perpetrated by local nationals against a purely domestic target,” ”international terrorism” refers to ”incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select domestic targets associated with a foreign state, or create an international incident by attacking airline passengers, personnel or equipment.”
None of the above definitions resolves all problems or satisfies all audiences. Some cases may be both domestic and international terrorism, for example, as in cases where a domestic group or government agency receives nonstate or state support from another jurisdiction.
International Actors and Causes
Mere listing of groups or organizations falling under the above definitions would require scores of pages, as shown by the long lists of designated terrorist individuals and groups maintained by U.S. agencies (for example, the Departments of State and Treasury), the United Nations, or the European Union.
Terrorism is usually associated with the activity of small groups, especially when state actors are not directly involved. Some groups enjoy more popularity or legitimacy than others, but the number of active participants is typically low (for example, Red Brigades in Italy or 17 of November in Greece), with the exception of widely supported insurgency, nationalist, and liberation types of movements (for example, PLO, IRA, Iraq insurgents). In general, the most radical and extreme groups can be expected to be more violent and least followed by the societal groups they may claim to represent. Sometimes, they are splinter groups of larger legitimate or illegal organizations.
In some instances, government agencies directly or indirectly support and sponsor terrorist groups (for example, the support of Hizbullah by Iran, the Pan Am plane bombing by Libya, Kashmir extremists by Pakistan, Islamic Jihad by Syria, or the Nicaraguan Contras by the United States). In other cases, governmental actors may engage in acts covered by some of the above definitions themselves (for example, French bombing of Greenpeace vessel or U.S. mining of Nicaraguan civilian ports— in the first case, the head of French intelligence was fired, while the World Court condemned the latter).
The varieties of international terrorist groups transcend the categories of left-wing, right-wing, and special interest causes of domestic terrorism. Even though the stigma of terrorist may also be meant to attribute irrationality and fanaticism to opponents, the causes and motives leading to extreme actions range from psychological to socioeconomic, political, ethnic, cultural, and religious.
Islamic extremism has received the lion’s share of attention in the aftermath of the atrocities of September 11, 2001. Contrary to numerous writings in the West, the original meaning of ”jihad” is not war or holy war (against the United States, the West, Jews, and Christians). Rather, it means struggle, exertion, or striving in a religious sense; doing one’s best in the cause of Allah, which may include inner struggles as well as campaigning for justice and truth.
The Muslim community (”umma”) contains many varieties, differing traditions, and currents even among conservative and political groups. Militant Islamists, often called ”jihadists,” are a small minority within such groups.
Research has demonstrated that terrorist actions have emerged from Christian, Islamic, Jewish, Sikh, and Buddhist communities. While some may be tempted to argue that this means all religions may give rise to militancy and violence, others may wonder whether this suggests that religion is actually not the main answer. If all religions can underlie militancy, perhaps sociopolitical, economic, and cultural explanations may offer better insights. It may be that religion is the means through which essentially secular grievances are articulated and propagated.
Issues such as freedom, self-determination, independence, poverty, justice, and equality have been at the core of both secular and religious militancy. Analysts note that even al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s variety of terror is due less to Islamic fundamentalism than to the pursuit of the strategic goal of noninterference in Muslim countries by the West.
Secular extremism has been the main concern during the past century, particularly during the Cold War and the proxy wars that accompanied it. Ironically, many see some roots of present-day religious extremism in the context of sponsorship of ”mujahideen” (holy warriors) in Afghanistan against the Soviet-supported government in Kabul.
Some groups are hierarchically organized, others are simply a tiny team, while others are best described as loose networks. Some collaborate with each other, while others are mutually exclusive. There is no single theory on what drives ordinary people to do extraordinary things. Regardless of the particular perspective one employs to study international terrorism, the causes and effects of different groups can only be understood in their own historical, socioeconomic, and political context, taking into account grievances, available options, opportunities and resources, interactions among local and external political powers, and culture.
Globalization and easy communication have made terrorism to some extent contagious. Financial or intellectual support by sympathizers to a cause (confirmation of ethnic identity, for example) has been evident in virtually every conflict and ethnic group involved. Sometimes, terrorist groups get involved in purely criminal and profit-oriented misconduct or form ad hoc and temporary alliances with criminal entrepreneurs [for example, Abu Sayyaf, FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia) and AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), Tamil Tigers, the Kosovo Liberation Army, the Northern Alliance, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan or GIA (Armed Islamic Group)].
The resort to petty or organized crime for financial resources may have been aided by diminished state sponsorship of international terrorism after the end of the Cold War. State sponsorship remains a controversial issue to this day, since there is still material and military support of regimes with very poor human rights records.
Finally, states may be involved in terrorism directly or through proxies. The classification of the acts as terrorism will depend largely on whether they occur at war or other armed conflict and how necessary or justified they are regarded by the international community.
Terrorism is most often intended as an act of communication. The terrorist message may be expressive, articulate, or inconsistent and unpersuasive. The audience is wider than the direct targets and victims, which points to the crucial role of the media, the Internet, and the battle for public perceptions. The 9/11 attacks illustrate the impact of spectacular, sensational, and widely seen attacks. This event became a landmark and brought about a dramatic shift in U.S. and international responses to terrorism—even though the total number of victims was much smaller than in other domestic and international crimes of organized violence. Genocidal events in Rwanda and other parts of Africa, which benefited of less or no television and global media coverage, generated a weaker response even though millions of people have been systematically massacred.
Acts of international terrorism may be effective but are seldom (if ever) successful in terms of achieving their ultimate or stated goals. Even if certain groups appear to succeed (Algerian, Palestinian, or Jewish groups fighting for independence or statehood), it is still questionable whether it was extreme actions or other factors that decided the final outcome. In other words, terrorism may produce serious consequences and attention, but it does not really work.
The most common means of attack are violence and information (use of cyberspace and the media for propaganda and public announcements), even though officials in many countries are concerned about the potential use of technology and weapons of mass destruction in the future. Typically, terrorist groups are too weak or small for open attacks, so their violence is in the form of assassinations, bombings, suicide attacks, targeted or random killings, sabotage, and hijackings.
The acts of state terrorism also cover a range of acts from bombings and mass killings of civilians to external support of local terrorist groups and militias. Colonial, occupational, and racist regimes have employed psychological terror, arbitrary arrests, summary trials and executions, torture, apartheid, disappearances, and other human right violations aimed at the elimination of opposition to their rule.
Measuring international terrorism is a difficult challenge. Statistical data and chronologies are available from the U.S. State Department, the CIA, the RAND Corporation, the Terrorism Knowledge Base, and many other sources. None of the above, however, includes state terrorism in its analyses. The State Department’s Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003 was discontinued after some controversy. The National Counterterrorism Center’s methods are different and make analyses before and after 2005 harder.
Regardless of how one defines and counts nonstate international terrorism, the number of incidents and deaths has not been rising. Also contrary to popular perceptions, domestic terrorism (as defined above) is more significant than international terrorism and is concentrated mostly in the Middle East (including Iraq). Even jihadist groups target Muslims far more than the West.
Responses to International Terrorism
Such findings have serious policy implications, for they highlight the risk of overreacting. Self-proclaimed security experts, uncritical journalism, and single-cause agendas or biases have flooded the media with misleading analyses and misunderstandings.
As the United States deploys its full diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, informational, intelligence, and military arsenal in the ”war on terror,” it is imperative to construct policy responses on the basis of good evidence and analysis.
At the domestic level, we have had the introduction of several acts in response to international terrorist threats, such as the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 and the Antiterrorism Acts of 1987, 1990, 1992, and 1996. More recently, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001. Executive orders include one in 1995 by President Bill Clinton and a multitude by President George W. Bush. The U.S. war on terror came also with a higher defense budget, war in Afghanistan, a new strategy on preemption, a host of financial controls, and a drastic governmental reorganization.
At the international level, the lack of a definition of terrorism and the states’ disagreements over the characterization of certain groups (for example, the Contras, IRA, Hamas) has led to instruments dealing with particular terrorist acts (such as hijackings and political assassinations) rather than terrorism in general.
Since 1963, twelve universal conventions and protocols against terrorism and the recent International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are the core of the United Nations response to international terrorism. Typically, the instruments do the following:
- Define certain acts as offenses, such as seizure of an aircraft in flight by threat or violence
- Require state parties to criminalize the offenses in their domestic laws
- Identify bases for jurisdiction over the defined offenses
- Oblige parties where suspects are found to either prosecute or extradite them (principle of ”no safe haven for terrorists”)
Consequences
Some of the concrete measures involve the creation and regular update of a list of individuals and organizations suspected of terrorism, enhanced monitoring of international flows of funds, mandated reporting of suspicious transactions detected by financial institutions, outsourcing to private companies of many security functions, the closing of charitable organizations, and aggressive intelligence gathering processes in the United States and overseas.
Some of the measures were genuinely collaborative with other countries and consistent with international norms, but others have caused controversies at home and internationally. For example, as of the beginning of 2006, still unresolved and hotly debated are the status and treatment of ”enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay, kidnapping and extraordinary rendition of suspects, torture, and the treatment of suspects, the criteria used to place suspects’ names on the U.N. and other lists, monitoring of communications outside proper procedures applicable under emergency circumstances, the lack of due process, and actions based on executive orders rather than on evidence admissible in court.
The consequences of terrorism are sometimes as unpredictable or unintended as those of counterterrorism. There is consensus that democracy cannot be protected through its abolition. Many countries succeeded in maintaining law and order and in overcoming past experiences with terrorism—from the left, the right, nationalist, or separatist groups—with their democracies intact. How to balance the need to protect innocent victims now against the preservation of our fundamental legal principles and international norms is a challenge of leadership and moral authority.
Clear and undisputed is the need to construct and implement not only short-term and military or law enforcement responses but also medium- and longer-term strategies and approaches that bring the international community and various ethnic or religious groups together and address the grievances and deep sources of problems found to cause individuals and groups to think or do the unthinkable.
Conclusion
International terrorism of various kinds has existed for centuries. Americans’ perceptions are shaped by the spectacular atrocities of 9/11 and the flood of reports in its aftermath. The threat may be sensationalized and exaggerated, leading to high costs, unnecessary measures, and limitations of freedoms and rights. Yet, it constitutes a serious challenge, especially in some regions outside the United States, which must be systematically monitored, studied, and analyzed. On this basis, we can expect an effective and just, preventive and reactive set of policies rendering this society and the international community more secure.
See also: International Police Cooperation; International Police Missions; INTERPOL and International Police Intelligence; PATRIOT Acts I and II; Terrorism: Definitional Problems; Terrorism: Domestic; Terrorism: Overview.
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